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ABSTRACT

Dukeman, Timothy Alan. M.A. The University of Memphis. May, 2013.
The Effects of Issue-free Cues. Major Professor: Dr. Eric Groenendyk
I propose an addition to the existing literature: “issue-free cues.” I
hypothesized that candidates are able to brand themselves with issue-free cues
(things like flags, poses, family, etc.) and that these cues can cause voters to
attribute positions to the candidate that do not necessarily line up with the
candidate’s actual positions, or these cues could activate particular beliefs held
by voters, rendering those beliefs more influential in their decision-making than
they otherwise would be. Or, finally, they could use symbolic imagery to produce
an emotional reaction that motivates voters to make their vote choice in a less
logical manner. I tested the effects of visual stimuli on candidate selection,
finding that candidates can, with even a small, subtle cue such as the
background of the picture, determine which issues drive the decision-making of
the very voters who are supposed to be holding them accountable.
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Review of the Literature
There is a clear consensus in Political Science literature that American
voters are not well-informed. Delli Carpini and Keeter quote Paul Blumberg, who
says, “Vast numbers of Americans are ignorant—not merely of the specialized
details of government which ordinary citizens cannot be expected to master, but
of the most elementary political facts—information so basic as to challenge the
central tenet of government”, calling it “America’s embarrassing little secret.”1
Delli Carpini and Keeter put forth that no political system can operate “effectively
and democratically” without an informed electorate, and discuss the fact that
such an uninformed electorate could constitute a “crisis” in American politics.2
Manipulation
What sort of crisis might be produced by an uninformed electorate? These
concerns can be summed up in one word: manipulation. The essence of
democracy is the ability of the people to hold government accountable and
replace poor legislators with representatives who are sufficiently concerned with
the interests of their constituents. If this accountability mechanism has been
somehow compromised, the very foundations of democracy are threatened. The
legitimacy of elections is severely undermined if they do not actually accomplish
the goal of holding governmental figures accountable for their actions.
Electoral integrity is compromised most severely when, on a large scale,
legislators are able to escape accountability by manipulating the public’s
1

Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics
and Why It Matters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 23.
2

Ibid.
1

perception of them. For clarity, I do not mean that manipulation is occurring when
a candidate powerfully and persuasively makes his case on the issues and
convinces voters to support him. It is manipulation when a candidate is able to
increase his support using tactics not even related to political issues (even
tangentially).
I propose an addition to the existing literature: “issue-free cues.” For
clarity, I conceive manipulation occurring in three distinct ways: symbols,
information, and priming. I put forth that candidates are able to brand themselves
with issue-free cues (things like flags, poses, family, etc.) and that these cues
can cause voters to attribute positions to the candidate that do not necessarily
line up with the candidate’s actual positions, or activate particular beliefs held by
voters, rendering those beliefs more influential in their decision-making than they
otherwise would be. Or, finally, they use symbolic imagery to produce an
emotional reaction that motivates voters to make their vote choice in a less
logical manner.
In cases of manipulation through information/branding, I posit that, instead
of researching the candidate further, voters simply assume that the candidate is
substantively similar to candidates who exhibit similar secondary characteristics.
In other words, if socially conservative candidates typically brand themselves in
very specific ways (beyond issue preferences, of course), then voters will also
expect a candidate who displays the same secondary characteristics (issue-free
cues) to be socially conservative. For example, since many socially conservative
candidates intentionally brand themselves as being extremely patriotic, then an

2

American Flag may act as an issue-free cue in this way, allowing the candidate
to manipulate voters. It could also mean things such as safety and security,
leading voters to perceive a candidate as more hawkish on national defense
issues than he actually is.
An information manipulation would work by causing voters to think that
they agree with the candidate more, making them more likely to vote for him.
This is a mediating relationship: the information manipulation produces increased
agreement, which increases both support and the odds that a voter will choose
that candidate. See below:

Information Manipulation

Increased Agreement

Vote

Additionally, an American Flag also evokes emotion, and can act as a
symbol, which could produce the second type of manipulation: manipulation
through symbols. In symbolic manipulation, voters’ emotions are evoked,
producing a much less logical decision-making process, and replacing an
evaluation of interests with a vague sense of sentiment. This is a mediating
relationship: the symbolic manipulation produces increased emotion, which
increases both support and the odds that a voter will choose that candidate. See
below:

Symbolic Manipulation

Increased Emotion

3

Vote

Finally, there is priming manipulation, where a visual, verbal, or other cue
is used to focus the voter’s attention on particular issues and to prioritize those
issues, bringing them to salience. This is a subtle form of manipulation, which
can warp voters’ decision-making process, allowing important issues to be
ignored in favor of much less significant ones that are favorable to the candidate
(obviously, drawing attention to an issue is not always manipulation). This is a
moderating relationship: the priming manipulation moderates the effect of
agreement on vote choice, which increases support and the odds that a voter will
choose that candidate (if they agree on those issues). See below:

Priming Manipulation

Agreement

Vote

Unit I. Information
Many researchers propose that citizens use heuristics, or information
shortcuts, to circumvent the cost of acquiring information and their own
limitations in understanding complex political issues. Further, there is evidence to
show that voters who utilize heuristics are often able to vote similarly to those
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with nearly complete information.3 Advocates of heuristics note the diminishing
returns of information, and it is also important to emphasize that heuristics will be
even more effective in a polarized political environment such as the one we see
today.
Arthur Lupia, in “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of
Information” discusses the use of heuristics in a public referendum vote. He
notes that one of the criticisms of referendum votes charges that voters are not
sufficiently informed to make complex policy decisions. The default solution is to
educate voters about the intricacies of policy, ensuring that they are equipped to
make informed decisions.
He argues for a different approach, since he asserts (reasonably) that
many voters would not volunteer to acquire such information, since they are
much more concerned with the affairs of daily life. Lupia’s solution is to sort out
which situations could be addressed by the existence of credible cues to help
voters make more accurate inferences, stating that those who desire more
informed outcomes would do well to make certain that credible cues are provided
to voters, who, in the aggregate, have an interest in electoral outcomes, the
capability of simple comparative reasoning, and other duties commanding their
attention. Most importantly, his study finds particular circumstances under which
an uninformed voter can utilize heuristics, even with a possibly unreliable
information provider, to increase the likelihood of making the same decision the

3

Lupia, Arthur. "Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information."
American Political Science Review 86, (1992): 390-404.
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voter would have made if completely informed.4 Lupia has demonstrated that
voters do respond to clear cues, but he does not examine the possibility of using
such cues to manipulate voters.
Another approach to heuristics is provided by Brady and Sniderman who
defend against the charge of an uninformed electorate by proposing that voters
can and do use a simple “likability” heuristic, noting that many in the mass public
clearly have only a minimal knowledge about politics and believe many things
about the world of politics that are only “minimally interconnected.” Regardless,
Brady and Sniderman purport, the general public is “remarkably accurate at
figuring out the issue positions of groups,” including liberals and conservatives,
who would “hardly seem to be highly salient to the general public.”5
Lupia later studied the results of a California election, concluding that
political scientists should seek a deeper understanding of how voters adjust to
the ambiguity that typifies many of their important decisions. He suggests that
directing our efforts into the provision of “credible and widely accessible ‘signals’”
may be a more effective and efficient method of maximizing the sensitivity of
electoral outcomes to the predilections of the electorate.6

4

Ibid.

5

Henry Brady and Paul Sniderman, “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias:
Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” The
American Political Science Review 79, no. 4 (December 1985): 1073.
6

Arthur Lupia, “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” The American Political Science
Review 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 72.
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Richard Lau and David Redlawsk challenge the often unproven
supposition that cognitive "heuristics" improve the decision-making abilities of
everyday voters. They find that cognitive heuristics are at times employed by
almost all voters and that heuristics are much more commonly utilized when the
choice situation facing voters is complex.7 This would seem to suggest that
informational manipulation would be extremely effective, especially on complex
issues.
Lau and Redlawsk show an interaction between political sophistication
and heuristic use on the quality of decision making. Their data show that heuristic
use generally increases the probability of a correct vote by political experts but
decreases the probability of a correct vote by novices.8 This is compelling
because, as we saw in Delli Carpini and Keeter, most American voters are
political novices (see also Converse 19649). Lau and Redlawsk also show that
experts are also sometimes led astray by heuristic use.10
Clearly, the efficiency of heuristics is not yet a closed case in political
science literature; further study is needed. Additionally, is it possible that political

7

Richard Lau and David Redlawsk, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive
Heuristics in Political Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4
(October 2001): 951-71.
8

Ibid.

9

Converse, P. E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter
(Ed.). Ideology and discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.
10

Richard Lau and David Redlawsk, “Advantages and Disadvantages of
Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science
45, no. 4 (October 2001): 951-71.
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candidates, knowing that heuristics can lead even the most sophisticated voters
astray, might be incentivized to take advantage of this phenomenon in a lessthan-honest way?
Representativeness and Bias in Heuristics
Having explained the concept of informational manipulation through issuefree cues, I will now explain the mechanism for this phenomenon. Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman, in their seminal article “Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases”, detail that heuristics are frequently utilized when people
have to make decisions in situations highlighted by uncertainty. However,
individuals specifically utilize one type of heuristic above all others:
representativeness. In spite of compelling reasons to believe otherwise (basic
statistical theory, simple probability, sample size, etc.), most people base their
judgments almost entirely on representativeness, or how similar one thing is to
another.11
It is important to realize, that, even in uncertain circumstances, individuals
are very confident in their judgments based on representativeness. Kahneman
and Tversky explain this as an illusion of validity. Specifically, when people see a
repeated pattern of events, they express much greater confidence in predicting
that this pattern will continue. There is also a high degree of bias in judgment due
to the retrievability of instances.12 I cite these two particular biases because

11

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases,” Science 185 (Sept. 27, 1974): 1124-31.
12

Ibid.
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issue-free cues trade on retrievability and representativeness. If voters become
accustomed to seeing hawkish, socially conservative candidates brand
themselves in a particular way, then they will expect this pattern to continue.
Their confidence in their judgments will be further increased by the fact that they
can easily recall instances of candidates with certain characteristics branding
themselves in certain ways.
In many ways, testing issue-free cues is testing the effects of
representativeness. A similar method of testing this concept was undertaken by
Kyle Mattes, Michael Spezio, Hackjin Kim, Alexander Todorov, Ralph Adolphs,
and R. Michael Alvarez. They presented subjects with images of political
candidates and asked them to make four trait judgments based solely on viewing
the photographs.
Respondents were asked which of the two faces revealed more
competence, attractiveness, deceitfulness, and threat, which are perhaps four of
the most salient attributes that can be conveyed by faces. They then compared
subjects’ choices to the actual election outcomes, and found that the candidates
chosen as more likely to physically threaten the subjects actually lost 65% of the
real elections, and their data show a positive correlation between the
competence judgments and the real election outcomes.13

13

Kyle Mattes, Michael Spezio, Hackjin Kim, Alexander Todorov, Ralph Adolphs
and R. Michael Alvarez. “Predicting Election Outcomes from Positive and Negative Trait
Assessments of Candidate Images” Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2010),
pp. 41-58 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655444
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It is important to understand the ramifications of this research: if there is a
strong correlation between visual judgments and electoral outcomes, this signals
that voters are (partially) making their decisions based on such cues. And, if
candidates learn how to present their appearance in the most flattering way, then
their appearance, while devoid of issue content, could be interpreted as
information regarding what kind of candidate they are (especially if there is a
pattern of candidates looking that way). In this way, issue-free cues are simply
applied psychology.
Elite Cues
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes’ The American Voter14 found that
party identification is much more stable over time than issue preferences,
suggesting that voters are indeed resolving cognitive dissonance by amending
their issue preferences to match the platform of their chosen party. In contrast,
Matthew Levendusky argues “that elite polarization, by clarifying where the
parties stand on the issues of the day, causes ordinary voters to adopt more
consistent attitudes.”15 He suggests that, once elites have provided clear cues,
voters will change their preferences to match the cues.
Larry Bartels argues that, rather than party identification being a result of
voters matching their preferences with the party platform, it is actually

14

Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes,
The American Voter (New York: University Of Chicago Press, 1980), 223.
15

Matthew Levendusky, “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of
Elite Polarization,” Political Behavior 32, no. 1 (2010): 111.

10

backwards, that party identification directly causes issue preference, “partisan
loyalties have pervasive effects on perceptions of the political world...partisanship
is...a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens perceptions of, and reactions to,
the political world.”16 One could argue that party identification results in a voter
adopting his party’s values, and therefore having his interests represented as a
member of that party. If Bartels is correct, the implications for democracy are
severe. For democracy to function, voters must not be so pliable, so easily
convinced of what is in their best interest.
The On-line Model
Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau argue that citizens’ collective lack of ability
to recall information is not actually damning, since what actually takes place is an
updating of voter preferences with each new piece of information, after which the
information is discarded and forgotten. They find strong support for an on-line
model of the candidate evaluation process that shows that adjust their overall
evaluation of the candidates in response to their instant evaluation of campaign
messages and events. Over time, they put forth, people forget most of the
campaign information they are exposed to but are nonetheless able to later
recollect their “summary affective evaluation of candidates” which they then use
to inform their preferences and vote choice.
They describe this process, as a ‘bounded rationality’ model of candidate
evaluation and vote choice that “turns the memory-based assumption on its head

16

Larry Bartels, “Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political
Perceptions,” Political Behavior 24, no. 2 (June 2002): 138.
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in arguing that citizens can be (and in fact typically are) responsive to campaign
information—their overall evaluations reflecting their assessment of all the
information they are exposed to—but are unable, for good reasons, to recollect
accurately the considerations that entered into their evaluations.”17 Issue-free
cues are relevant to a discussion of the on-line model, since the model requires
accurate information to correctly function. In a case of information manipulation
using issue-free cues, a candidate could cause a voter’s on-line model to
malfunction if he can get the voter to view issue-free cues as information,
changing the running tally to his favor.
Unit II. Symbols
It is a truism that candidates often make ambiguous statements about the
policies they intend to pursue. In theory, ambiguity affects how voters make
choices and who wins elections. Michael Tomz and Robert Van Houweling
conducted survey experiments by manipulating what is likely the most common
form of ambiguity: the imprecision of candidate positions. They find that, on
average, ambiguity does not decrease a candidate’s support, and it may even
attract voters.18
Tomz and Van Houweling show that in the absence of party cues, voters
who have neutral or positive attitudes toward risk are more likely to respond
17

Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen and Shawn Brau, “The Responsive
Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation,” The American
Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309-10,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082427 (accessed December 1, 2011).
18
Michael Tomz and Robert Van Houweling, “The Electoral Implications of
Candidate Ambiguity,” American Political Science Review 103, no. 1 (February 2009):
page nr.
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positively to ambiguous rhetoric, along with those who feel uncertain about their
own policy preferences.19 Surprisingly, in partisan settings, voters respond even
more positively to ambiguity, optimistically perceiving the locations of ambiguous
candidates from their own party.
Curiously, Tomz and Van Houweling do not find that voters pessimistically
perceiving the viewpoints of vague candidates from the opposition, however. To
bring more practicality to their results, they also tested and found that candidates
do use ambiguity and voters do recognize it, concluding that ambiguity can be an
effective strategy, especially in partisan elections.20
Issue-free cues fit into the framework of ambiguity, since, if indeed voters
are interpreting issue-free cues as information, it is likely that the information is
ambiguous, and also likely that the effects observed by Tomz and Van
Houweling (voters optimistically locate candidates when candidates are
ambiguous) would also be present with issue-free cues. This also speaks to a
different aspect of issue-free cues: since Tomz and Van Houweling have
demonstrated that candidates have good reason to be ambiguous, it also stands
to reason that there is electoral incentive to utilize issue-free cues, if indeed they
function as I hypothesize, since issue-free cues may produce many of the same
effects. Further, if the American flag symbolizes safety and security, then there
should be measurable effects from exposure to an American flag, especially with
regards to risk-positive voters (more on symbols later).

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid.
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Ambivalence
But why does ambiguity work? Why do voters optimistically perceive
candidates who utilize ambiguous rhetoric? Part of the answer lies in the way
voters themselves approach the issues. If voters are truly ambivalent regarding
many important issues, then it makes sense for voters to respond positively to
ambiguity. Specificity requires a candidate to delve into at least some of the hard
cases, the aspects of the issue that pose problems for his view. But, if a
candidate remains safely ambiguous, he can pick up the positives of
ambivalence, namely that the voter feels that he represents them, without the
negatives (their difficulties in reconciling issue positions with their broader values,
for example).
But are voters ambivalent? If so, to what degree? Howard Lavine tested
this, providing empirical data to support the widely held belief that voters’ political
opinions are not only positive or negative, but are often simultaneously positive
and negative. Lavine found that ambivalence created instability in candidate
evaluations, and also significantly delayed the development of citizens' voting
intentions. Lavine’s results showed that effects of ambivalence were
“independent of and typically larger than those of partisanship strength,
information, education, and attitude strength, and could not be meaningfully
accounted for by any of these factors.”21

21

Howard Lavine, “The Electoral Consequences of Ambivalence toward
Presidential Candidates,” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (October
2009): 915-29.
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Once again, I would argue that issue-free cues will work in much the same
way (and for some of the same reasons) that ambiguity works, and issue-free
cues are more effective because of citizens’ ambivalence. They allow voters to
not think about the intricacies of the issue and simply focus on the symbolic
aspects of the candidate’s presentation.
Symbols
Is it possible that there are conditions under which issue preferences are
not even relevant to a voter’s decision-making? Bringing more clarity to the
picture of how voters make decisions is a seminal article by David Sears, Richard
Lau, Tom Tyler, and Harry Allen, which studied the effects of short-term selfinterest with respect to longstanding symbolic outlooks. Sears, Lau, Tyler, and
Allen found that the various self-interest measures have little effect in shaping
both policy preferences or voting behavior.
In contrast, symbolic attitudes (liberal or conservative ideology, party
identification, and racial prejudice) had significant effects.22 Even more
compellingly, Sear, Lau, Tyler and Allen found that self-interest does not create
constraint in the attitudes of voters, even on issues that were used in the study.
Murray Edelman also outlines a compelling model of symbols as an integral part
of how humans make sense of their surroundings, emphasizing the significance

22

David Sears et al., “Self-Interest Vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and
Presidential Voting,” The American Political Science Review, 74, no. 3 (Sep. 1980): 67084.
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of ceremony, sanctity, procession, pomp, and circumstance as organizing factors
in the way citizens view the world.23
He delineates between two sorts of symbols: condensation symbols and
referential symbols. Even though every symbol has referential properties,
referring to something other than itself, symbols also evoke attitudes,
impressions, and encourage viewers to see a pattern of events associated
through time, space, logic, and imagination and to associate these events with
that symbol.
He defines referential symbols as economical ways of referring to
objective elements (those things that everyone can agree on in a situation). This
is in contrast to condensation symbols, which are used to evoke specific
emotions, imbue events with particular qualities, be they tragedy, corruption,
threat, etc. He also notes that symbols are important for capturing things like
patriotic pride, anxieties, memories of past glory, and promises of future
greatness.24 Truly, Edelman argues, the sources of emotion in politics are
symbols.
Where does this leave us? Are there alternative explanations? Sears, Lau,
Tyler, and Allen show that, even under conditions designed to induce more selfinterested political attitudes, such as individualistic personal values, a perception
of the policy area as a major national problem, high political sophistication, a
perception of responsive government, or a strong sense of political efficacy, there
23

Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Illini books ed. (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1985), page 6.
24
Ibid.

16

was still no effect.25 Clearly, there is strong empirical support for the effects of
symbols on voter attitudes and behavior. Since the literature already
demonstrates that symbols affect voting behavior, this is strong support for my
argument regarding symbolic manipulation using issue-free cues.
Emotion
How does this less reflective process work? How does a politician induce
voters to focus on the symbolic aspects? Victor C. Ottati, Marco R. Steenbergen,
and Ellen Riggle discuss how previous literature suggests that beliefs and
emotions operate as partially distinct determinants of political attitudes, and,
while positive and negative beliefs about a political object are “bipolar in
structure,” positive and negative emotions have been shown to be relatively
independent. In this past, researchers tested beliefs and emotions with different
measures, but Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle hypothesized that responses to
survey items may often be influenced by the manner in which the researcher
poses the questions, which would cast doubt on the conclusions.26
Consequently, it remains unclear whether the uniqueness of these belief
and emotion measures reflects a “bona fide difference between two underlying
constructs, or merely an artifactual difference induced by differing methods of

25

David Sears et al., “Self-Interest Vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and
Presidential Voting,” The American Political Science Review, 74, no. 3 (Sep. 1980): 67084.
26

Ottati, Victor, Marco Steenbergen and Ellen Riggle. "The Cognitive and
Affective Components of Political Attitudes: Measuring the Determinants of Candidate
Evaluation." Political Behavior 14 (1992), http://www.jstor.org/stable/586573 (accessed
April 11, 2013).
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measurement.” Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle show that beliefs and emotions
operate as “partially unique predictors of candidate evaluation” even when
employing corresponding methods of measurement.27 Their results demonstrate
that emotion and beliefs must be tested and examined separately.
In much the same way, I expect to observe that issue-free cues will elicit
emotions, but I add to Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle’s model by proposing that
instead of merely changing the way citizens make decisions, citizens actually
derive information (on a limited basis) from issue-free cues. So, while research
like Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle’s will show that emotions are driving the
effects, I believe that there are other effects that (to this point) have yet to be
measured. This is important because I believe that the same issue-free cue can
produce both effects.
Unit III. Priming
How do important psychological concepts such as priming fit into this
discussion? Priming has a significant place in psychological literature, and it also
has a measurable effect on candidate choice. In Follow the Leader? How Voters
Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance, Gabriel Lenz tests the effects
of priming, but there is one particular test that is especially relevant. After running
other tests on priming, Lenz re-ran the test on a specific subset of participants:
those respondents who already knew the parties’ or candidates’ positions on
issues before the issue came to prominence and still knew them afterward.
Among this smaller group of voters (those who should be most affected by

27

Ibid.
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priming), Lenz does not find evidence for priming, and, in his results, the average
effect across all the cases is close to zero.28
However, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder tested this in News That
Matter, finding that priming has a robust effect on candidate selection, across
parties and still significant in different experimental arrangements.29 Additionally,
Iyengar and Kinder test and confirm that television news networks call attention
to some issues while ignoring others, effectively providing citizens with a
framework to evaluate governments, presidents, policies, and candidates.30
James Druckman finds compelling evidence that a political campaign did
in fact prime “exposed and attentive voters to base their decisions on the issues
and images emphasized in the campaign”, enhancing our understanding of
campaign effects, and showing that “findings from basic political psychology
research apply to actual electoral settings”, (demonstrating the external validity of
priming research).31
Christine A. Kelleher and Jennifer Wolak examined the degree to which
the content of an issue prime drives its use in presidential approval. While

28

Gabriel S. Lenz, Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians'
Policies and Performance (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2012), 77-81.
29

Donald R. Kinder and Shanto Iyengar, News That Matters: Television and
American Opinion (American Politics and Political Economy Series) (London: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), 63-72.
30

Ibid.
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Druckman, James. "Priming the Vote: Campaign Effects in a U.S. Senate
Election." Political Psychology 25, No. 4 (2004), Article Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792410 (accessed March 27, 2013).
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disparities in the effectiveness of media priming are traditionally ascribed to
individual differences in political sophistication and news exposure, Kelleher and
Wolak use a macro level approach, combining public opinion data on presidential
approval from 1981 to 2000 with content analyses of presidential news coverage
to test how media attention affects the way issues are weighted in presidential
approval. They find that “the effectiveness of issue primes depends on issue
content, such that familiar and understandable issues are more likely to be
primed than more complex and difficult issues.”32
I wish to clarify that issue-free cues are not only an instance of strategic
priming. In cases of priming, the presentation of issues brings them to salience,
creating a new framework by which the voter will evaluate candidates, policies,
etc. In my framework of issue-free cues, rather than changing the evaluative
structure of information, issue-free cues can also act as information, and,
sometimes, at the expense of better information, as we saw in Kahneman and
Tversky’s results. Additionally, the same issue-free cue can also have a symbolic
effect by evoking emotion.
Place in the Literature
This study falls into much of the existing literature by testing ideas
surrounding heuristics, symbols, information processing, priming, and ambiguity.
Most specifically, I tested the effects of visual stimuli on candidate selection.
These issue-free cues cause voters to “fill in the gaps”, so to speak, and assume

32

Kelleher, Christine and Jennifer Wolak. "Priming Presidential Approval: The
Conditionality of Issue Effects." Political Behavior 28, No. 3 (2006), Article Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500220 (accessed March 27, 2013).
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that the candidate agrees with their issue positions, even on issues that the
candidate has not taken a position, cause voters to view particular issues as
more important than they otherwise would, and also act symbolically to elicit
emotion.
I argue that since the voter already expects the candidate to be socially
conservative, for example, then the voter will naturally (and automatically) fill in
the candidate’s platform (at least partially) with the positions the voter
understands to be socially conservative. Since voters are conditioned by elites to
see issue preferences in packages, they will simply apply that idea, resulting in
the voter filling in issue preferences that fit the package.
This functions as a heuristic of sorts, but a much less reliable one than
endorsements, party identification, etc. While issue-free cues are heuristics, they
differ from the typical conception in that issue-free cues are not always efficient
or accurate heuristics, and candidates can take advantage of voters’ use of
issue-free cues to possibly brand themselves in a misleading fashion for the sake
of ingratiating themselves to voters who do not share their issue preferences.
It may be, however, that issue-free cues function also as a priming
mechanism, causing voters to think more deeply and carefully about particular
issues, bringing those issues to prominence and resulting in the voter making his
or her decision with those issues a central part of the decision-making process.
Additionally, I believe that this theory has implications for the on-line
model, since it may demonstrate that the information used to form opinions may
not actually be information at all, and merely issue-free cues gleaned from
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associations. If it can be compellingly demonstrated that issue-free cues can and
often do drive candidate choice, the implications for the on-line model would be
significant: voters are making decisions not based on a running tally of
information, but actually based on a running tally of information and also issuefree cues. While Lodge may have anticipated this eventuality in crafting his
model, it certainly would have implications for representative democracy.
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Research Design
I utilized an experiment to collect my data, presenting participants with two
candidates who have similar issue positions and asking them which candidate
they would be more likely to support. The issue positions of both candidates were
moderate in nature (borrowed from conservative democratic Senators Ben
Nelson and Bill Nelson), but with slight alterations to make results clearer. To
avoid party effects, they were not labeled as Democrats or Republicans.
Procedure
The first condition will be the control condition, which will flesh out if there
is any reason to believe that one candidate is naturally more popular, without the
help of issue-free cues. The results from Condition 1 will provide a baseline for
comparison, allowing me to establish the effects of issue-free cues, since the
other two conditions will otherwise be identical.
The second condition kept the first candidate exactly the same as he
appeared in Condition 1, but the second candidate was manipulated. Candidate
Two was presented with a giant American Flag in the background. Otherwise, he
was completely identical to Condition 1. The third condition again kept Candidate
One constant, but Candidate Two was in a forest.
I stress that the only difference between the conditions is the background
of the picture of Candidate Two (Sean Stevens. See Appendices and the chart
below), since the conditions are completely identical other than the background
of the pictures (issue positions, poses, dress, etc.). Because the conditions are
so rigorously controlled, I can be confident that any observed differences
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between the groups were due to the independent variable, issue-free cues. See
the chart below for further details.

Condition

1

2

3

Randall Johnson

Randall Johnson

Randall Johnson

Sean Stevens

Sean Stevens

Sean Stevens

Issue
Positions

Same issue
positions

Same issue
positions

Same issue
positions

Control
candidate
(Johnson)
background

Beige Wall

Beige Wall

Experimental
candidate
(Stevens)
background

Brick Wall

Flag

Candidate

Beige Wall

Forest

I am primarily concerned with the difference between conditions. It is
considerably less important how popular each candidate is. What matters, for the
purpose of this study, is whether or not Candidate Two (Sean Stevens) is
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perceived differently in the experimental conditions than in the control condition.
Unit I: Data
My data was derived from a convenience sample of University of Memphis
students. While there may be some concern regarding the use of a convenience
sample, I argue that a study of this type was not significantly skewed by the use
of a convenience sample. Even though knowledge levels may vary with a sample
such as this one, there is no reason to believe that the underlying psychological
processses being measured in this study do not function the same way that we
might see in a more diverse sample. I tested a new idea: issue-free cues, and
while it would be ideal to conduct a large study of a nationally representative
sample, but that would be cost-prohibitive, and this serves as an able pilot study.
Recruitment
To recruit subjects, I simply asked permission from professors to
administer a survey in their classes. I will enter a class, and the students who
wish to participate will be given surveys. Students who do not wish to participate
were given the option to receive extra credit by writing a short essay on how they
believe responsible citizens should select candidates. This gave me a sufficiently
large sample (255 students) to attain statistical significance in my variables.
Unit II: Measures
I utilized post-test measures to determine the effects of issue-free cues on
voter behavior. The first part of the experiment was the ballot portion. Each
participant received a survey with a ballot paper-clipped to it. Participants were
instructed to first make a decision on which candidate they would like to vote for.
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After voting for their candidate of choice, they handed in their ballot and started
the survey portion.
The first set of questions were a basic set of party identification questions,
allowing me to look at partisans separately, followed by some emotion questions
to shed light on the possible effects of symbols, testing whether or not emotions
were being affected by issue-free cues.
Additionally, there were also be questions about the subject’s own political
views, so I can determine if the issue-free cues induce some groups of voters
more than others to support a candidate, and to also determine if certain groups
of voters may be induced to not support a candidate who uses specific issue-free
cues. If the experimental conditions had produced a statistically significant effect
on issue positions, then that would have provided extremely strong support for
the theory, especially if the effects were in issue areas related to the stimulus
(such as national defense or environmental issues).
The next set of questions was about the candidates’ respective positions.
Participants were asked to rate both the control candidate and the experimental
candidate on how conservative or liberal they are on a range of issues (social,
military/defense, economic, environmental). These questions allow us to see if
the issue-free cues produced a statistically significant effect on perceptions. For
example, if the flag condition produces more conservative ratings on
military/defense issues than the other two positions, or if the forest condition
produces more liberal ratings on environmental issues, then that would support
my theory.
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Next, the participants will be asked to rate how much they agree with each
candidate on different types of issues. This will illuminate if the issue-free cues
are causing participants in the experimental conditions to agree with the
candidate more often, even though the issue positions remain the same. If liberal
democrats agree with the experimental candidate more in the forest condition
than the control condition, that will support my theory.
Finally, there were questions about the candidates’ real positions (listed
on the original ballot that participants are given) and other questions about issues
that the candidates did not actually take a position on. These questions tested if
issue-free cues introduced systemic error in the recall of the candidates’ issue
positions.
Unit III: Hypotheses
I expect that certain types of voters are responsive to certain issue-free cues,
resulting in certain groups moving toward or away from candidates in response to
their perceptions about that candidate. More specifically, I expect to see
Democrats supporting the experimental candidate significantly more often in
Condition 3, in response to the issue-free cue of the forest background, because
the forest will signal a strong environmental perspective. Correspondingly, given
the nationalistic nature of much Republican culture, I expect to see Republicans
supporting the experimental candidate significantly more in the flag condition. In
this way, I expect the effect of issue-free cues to be moderated by party effects.
Confirmation/Disconfirmation: Specifically, this hypothesis is confirmed if the
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experimental conditions are statistically significant variables when candidate
choice is the dependent variable.
Hypothesis One: Republicans will support the experimental candidate more often
in the flag condition, and Democrats will support the experimental candidate
more often in the forest condition.
I hypothesize that participants will attribute issue positions to both candidates
that they have not taken, but especially to the candidate utilizing issue-free cues.
Since voters are conditioned to receive issues in packages, I put forth that the
issue-free cues will result in greater attribution of issue preferences. If preference
attribution is equal across conditions, then it is not confirmed. This will test the
information manipulation discussed earlier.
Confirmation/Disconfirmation: Specifically, this hypothesis is confirmed if the
amount of issue preference attribution is not the same (which we would expect
from random error) in the experimental conditions as it is in the control condition.
Hypothesis Two: In response to the information manipulation, participants will
attribute positions not taken by the candidate (to both candidates) more
frequently in the experimental conditions.
Issue-free cues will cause participants in the experimental conditions to
perceive the experimental candidate’s issue preferences differently (even though
the candidate’s actual issue preferences have remained the same). Specifically, I
expect that in the flag condition, the experimental candidate will be perceived as
a more social/economic/military/defense conservative (across party lines) and in
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the forest condition, the experimental candidate will be perceived as more
environmentally liberal.
Further, I predict that this will happen in spite of the fact that the
experimental candidate (in all three conditions) is more of a military/defense
liberal (who also opposes a ban on flag desecration) and an environmental
conservative. I have intentionally designed the candidates’ issue positions for the
purpose of ascertaining the scope of the effect of issue-free cues. Specifically, if
participants read the issue-free cues as information that overrides the stated
issue positions on the ballot, then I will have observed a powerful effect indeed.
This will also test the information manipulation mentioned before. This is a
mediating relationship that I will confirm by examining the agreement questions.
Confirmation/Disconfirmation: Specifically, if participants agree with the
experimental candidate more often in the experimental conditions and rate his
positions as closer to their own, then Hypothesis Three is confirmed.
Hypothesis Three: Issue-free cues will be interpreted as information, and this
information manipulation will override the issue positions on the ballot.
I expect to see evidence of the symbolic aspects of issue-free cues. In response
to the symbolic cue, participants will display increased emotion in the
experimental conditions, and this will be measurable in the questions that ask
participants about their current emotional state. Specifically, I expect to see a
mediating relationship in which the mediator (emotion) is affected by the
treatment, and the mediator affects the dependent variable (vote choice). If I do
not find the first effect, it will not be necessary to test the second.
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Confirmation/Disconfirmation: The mediating relationship proposed in
Hypothesis Four will be confirmed if participants are more emotional in the
experimental conditions than in the control condition.
Hypothesis Four: Exposure to the treatment will increase emotion in response to
the symbolic manipulation.
Finally, Issue-free cues will act as a priming mechanism, producing an
interaction between the experimental conditions and how much the subjects
agree with the experimental candidate on issues such as national defense and
the environment. I expect that participants who agree with the experimental
candidate on national defense issues and flag desecration will vote for him more
often in the flag condition, and correspondingly, those who agree with his position
on environmental issues will vote for him more often in the forest condition. In
this way, I expect to see a moderating relationship; the issue-free cue will
moderate the effect of agreement on vote choice. To test this, I will examine the
interaction of agreement with the experimental conditions.
Confirmation/Disconfirmation: The moderating relationship proposed in
Hypothesis Five will be confirmed if the interaction of the experimental conditions
with agreement is statistically significant.
Hypothesis Five: Exposure to the treatment will increase the effect of agreement
on vote choice in response to the priming manipulation.
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Survey Questions
1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Republican, a
Democrat, an Independent, or what?
A. Republican
B. Democrat
C. Independent
D. Any other party
E. Don’t Know/ Prefer not to Answer

2. Would you call yourself a strong REPUBLICAN or not a very strong
REPUBLICAN?
a. Strong Republican
b. Not a Strong Republican
c. Don’t Know/ Prefer not to Answer

3. Would you call yourself a strong DEMOCRAT or not a very strong
DEMOCRAT?
A. Strong Democrat
B. Not a Strong Democrat
C. Don’t Know/ Prefer not to Answer

4. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the
Democratic Party?
A. Closer to the Republican Party
B. Closer to the Democratic Party
C. Neither
D. Don’t Know/ Prefer not to Answer

5. As an individual, to what extent do you feel angry about politics?
A. Not at all
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Very Much (7-point scale)
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6.

As an individual, to what extent do you feel afraid about politics?
A. Not at all
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Very Much (7-point scale)

7. As an individual, to what extent do you feel proud about politics?
A. Not at all
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Very Much (7-point scale)

8. As an individual, to what extent do you feel hopeful about politics?
A. Not at all
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Very Much (7-point scale)

9. As an individual, to what extent do you feel enthusiastic about politics?
A. Not at all
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G. Very Much (7-point scale)
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10. How would you rate YOUR OWN positions generally?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. How would you rate YOUR OWN positions on economic issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12. How would you rate YOUR OWN positions on social issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13. How would you rate YOUR OWN positions on military/defense issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14. How would you rate YOUR OWN positions on environmental issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15. How would you rate RANDALL JOHNSON’s positions generally?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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16. How would you rate RANDALL JOHNSON’s positions on economic
issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17. How would you rate RANDALL JOHNSON’s positions on social issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18. How would you rate RANDALL JOHNSON’s positions on
military/defense issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19. How would you rate RANDALL JOHNSON’s positions on environmental
issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20. How would you rate SEAN STEVENS’ positions generally?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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21. How would you rate SEAN STEVENS’ positions on economic issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22. How would you rate SEAN STEVENS’ positions on social issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23. How would you rate SEAN STEVENS’ positions on military/defense
issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24. How much would you rate SEAN STEVENS’ positions on environmental
issues?
Very Liberal
Very Conservative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25. How much would you say that you agree with RANDALL JOHNSON
overall?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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26. How much would you say that you agree with RANDALL JOHNSON on
economic issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27. How much would you say that you agree with RANDALL JOHNSON on
social issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28. How much would you say that you agree with RANDALL JOHNSON on
military/defense issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29. How much would you say that you agree with RANDALL JOHNSON on
environmental issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30. How much would you say that you agree with SEAN STEVENS overall?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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31. How much would you say that you agree with SEAN STEVENS on
economic issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

32. How much would you say that you agree with SEAN STEVENS on social
issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

33. How much would you say that you agree with SEAN STEVENS on
military/defense issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

34. How much would you say that you agree with SEAN STEVENS on
environmental issues?
Disagree Completely
Agree Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

35. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on
abortion?
A. Pro-Life
B. Pro-Choice
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember
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36. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on a
Constitutional ban on flag desecration?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

37. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on
bringing the troops home from Afghanistan as soon as possible?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

38. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on
tighter regulations on oil & gas smokestacks?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

39. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on
same-sex marriage?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

40. If you can remember, what was RANDALL JOHNSON’S position on
military intervention, if necessary, to prevent nuclear Iran?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember
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41. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on abortion?
A. Pro-Life
B. Pro-Choice
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

42. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on a
Constitutional ban on flag desecration?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

43. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on bringing
the troops home from Afghanistan as soon as possible?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

44. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on tighter
regulations on oil & gas smokestacks?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

45. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on same-sex
marriage?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember
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46. If you can remember, what was SEAN STEVENS’ position on military
intervention, if necessary, to prevent nuclear Iran?
A. Support
B. Oppose
C. He did not take a position
D. I don’t know/I can’t remember

47. What is your gender?
A. Male
B. Female

48. Do you consider yourself primarily White or Caucasian, Black or African
American, American Indian, Asian, Hispanic or Latino or something
else?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Black or African American
Asian or Pacific Islander
Hispanic or Latino/Latina
Native American
White or Caucasian
Other
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Results
Before discussing my hypotheses, I must clarify that, while the United
States is composed of about half Republicans and half Democrats, the University
of Memphis is overwhelming Democratic, leaving me with too few Republican
participants (only 64 out of 255 total participants) to analyze. Consequently, my
results regarding the effects of issue-free cues on Republicans are inconclusive,
and thus my discussion must be severely limited.

Table 1.
Party Identification

Number of Participants

Republicans

64

Democrats

113

True Independents

37

Independents (leaning Republican)

19

Independents (leaning Democrat)

22

Total

255

Table 2.
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Hypothesis

Result

I. Republicans will support the
experimental candidate more often in
the flag condition, and Democrats will
support the experimental candidate
more often in the forest condition.

Confirmed (among Democrats)

II. In response to the information
manipulation, participants will attribute
positions not taken by the candidate (to
both candidates) more frequently in the
experimental conditions.

Not Confirmed

III. Issue-free cues will be interpreted
as information, and this information
manipulation will override the issue
positions on the ballot.

Not Confirmed

IV. Exposure to the treatment will
increase emotion in response to the
symbolic manipulation.

Not Confirmed

V. Exposure to the treatment will
increase the effect of agreement on
vote choice in response to the priming
manipulation.

Confirmed (among Democrats)

My first hypothesis (see Table 2) predicted that Democrats would vote for
the experimental candidate more often in the forest condition. The data show a
few things very clearly: first, that one of the experimental manipulations (the
forest condition) most definitely has a measurable effect on particular
participants’ voting behavior. As predicted, the forest condition variable achieved
statistical significance as soon as the analysis was limited to Democrats. These
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results strongly support the idea that a difference as small as the background of
a candidate’s picture can have a substantial effect on even something as
important as candidate choice.
As Table 3 shows, the Democrats did indeed vote for the experimental
candidate more often when he had a forest in the background. We know this
because that coefficient, .506, is statistically significant. This result demonstrated
that issue-free cues did have an effect on participants’ voting behavior, but
further investigation is needed to determine the precise nature of the relationship
between issue-free cues and candidate choice. Specifically, Hypothesis One is
confirmed because the experimental condition (forest condition) is a statistically
significant variable when candidate choice is the dependent variable.
My second hypothesis predicted that participants would more frequently
attribute incorrect positions to both candidates in the experimental condition.
While null results are, by definition, inconclusive, the data suggest that this
prediction may have been refuted outright. Specifically, Hypothesis Two is not
confirmed because the data do not show a statistically significantly greater
amount of issue preference attribution (in contrast to the same amount, which we
would expect from random error) in the experimental conditions than in the
control condition.
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Table 3. The Impact of variables on Democrats’ (and leaners’) candidate choice

Flag

Forest

Candidate Choice
(without Interaction
terms)

Candidate Choice
(with Interaction
terms)

Coefficient

Coefficient

(Standard Error)

(Standard Error)

.300

.594*

(.265)

(.32)

.506*

.683*

(.265)

(.377)

Agreement on
Environment

.301***
(.099)

Interaction of
Flag*Agreement on
Environment

-.031
(.132)

Interaction of
Forest*Agreement on
Environment

Constant
p < .1*
p < .05**
p < .01***

.846**
(.423)

-.180

-.394*

(.180)

(.218)

Note: models are probit regressions.
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Information, Symbols, or Priming?
The nature of the relationship between issue-free cues and candidate
choice is significant. However, we must determine if this relationship is one of
symbols, if issue-free cues are being interpreted as information, or if they are
actually priming participants to focus on certain issue areas and bringing those
issues to the forefront of their decision-making calculus. Symbols are difficult to
measure meaning that an argument for symbols can only be made after
examining other explanations and possible causes.

1.2

Predicted Probabilities
1

0.8

Control
0.6

Flag
Forest

0.4

0.2

0

1 SD below mean

Mean

1 SD above mean

Figure 1.
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Particularly, since issue-free cues are certainly having an effect on
candidate choice, is it because participants perceive the issue-free cues as
information, which then influences their understanding of the candidate’s issue
positions? Or is there an interaction in play here—the issue-free cues are
moderating the effect of issue positions on vote choice?
There is no evidence that issue-free cues have been interpreted as
information, since the forest condition did not produce statistically significant
results for questions about:


How participants perceived the candidates as liberal or
conservative (even on the environment)



How much the participants agreed with the candidate on issues
other than the environment



How well the participants recalled the respective issue positions
taken by the candidates on the ballot.

Consequently, if issue-free cues do act as information, we cannot know
that from the data. Specifically, because participants did not agree with the
experimental candidate more often in the experimental conditions and rate his
positions as closer to their own (at a statistically significant level), Hypothesis
Three is not confirmed.
Further, there are several questions at the beginning of the posttest that
measure emotion, and none of them were statistically significant, which casts
doubt on a symbols story. Once again, like with the possibility of issue-free cues
as information, it is possible that this is happening, but we simply cannot know it
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from the data. Perhaps symbols and information do form part of the story, but
measurement error prevents them from showing up. A more powerful stimulus is
probably necessary to test such an idea, perhaps something with more symbolic
power than (part of) a flag or a forest that could affect participants on an
emotional level. A future study involving powerful evocative imagery would be in
order. Specifically, the mediating relationship proposed in Hypothesis Four was
not confirmed because participants were not more emotional in the experimental
conditions than in the control condition. Since participants were not more
emotional, it is clear that increased emotion did not affect their vote choice.

Predicted Probabilities
1.2

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
1 SD below mean

Mean
Forest Condition

Figure 2.

47

1 SD above mean

If we look at Figure 1, and the results in Table 3, there is a strong,
statistically significant relationship between how much agreement with the
experimental candidate on the environment affects Democrats’ vote choice and
the forest condition. Specifically, Figure 1 clarifies the broad shape of the data in
an important way: as agreement increases (see the bars representing each of
the three conditions), the likelihood of voting for the experimental candidate also
increases in all three conditions.
The important thing is that it increases significantly faster in the
experimental conditions (but especially the forest condition). When voters see
the forest in the background, their agreement with the experimental candidate on
environmental issues begins to drive their vote. In the forest condition, the
experimental candidate’s views on environmental issues were much more
important than in the other two conditions. This is an evident priming story; there
is a moderating relationship: the effect of agreement with the experimental
candidate’s environmental views on candidate choice is moderated by the issuefree cue of the forest background.
Figure 2 shows the effect more clearly in the forest condition: at one
standard deviation below the mean, participants almost never voted for the
experimental candidate, while at one standard deviation above the mean, they
voted for the experimental candidate every time. Figure 1 shows the relative
effects of the treatment, and it is clear that the experimental conditions increased
the effect of agreement on vote choice in both directions. As Table 3 shows, the
moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis Five was confirmed because the

48

interaction of the experimental conditions with agreement is statistically
significant. Given the clear trend in the data of an effect (Democrats having
higher support in the forest condition) and a reasonable, well-supported cause, I
am confident in asserting this conclusion: priming was the most important part of
the story.
Implications
Where does this leave us? First, it is important to note that a priming story
produces a much more optimistic portrayal of democracy than either of the other
possibilities discussed earlier. If the data showed a symbols story, that would
leave the American electorate susceptible to intense manipulation and prone to
very emotional decision-making. If the data showed an information manipulation,
this would be a most vexing condition, since voters would be easily deceived,
even in circumstances where reliable information is actually available. Such a
story would threaten the very foundations of representative democracy if it could
be conclusively demonstrated and replicated.
However, a priming story is still not encouraging, since it demonstrates
that candidates possess the power to determine the field on which the game will
be played: they can, with even a small, subtle cue such as the background of the
picture, determine which issues drive the decision-making of the very voters who
are supposed to be holding them accountable. This development does not
produce excitement regarding the reliability and functionality of representative
democracy, especially if this effect could be demonstrated to work such that
insignificant issues are outweighing significant issues in voters’ calculus (and I
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believe that it would work that way). I am left to conclude that we should discard
democracy as soon as a better alternative presents itself, but, since such an
alternative probably does not exist; we will have to muddle through with the
current system.
Recommendations
Further studies should seek to examine the moderating effect more
closely. First, a study examining the effects of issue-free cues on Republicans is
in order, since data limitations prevented such analysis here. Are there particular
demographics among Democrats that are especially sensitive (or impervious) to
this effect? As mentioned before, it would be ideal if a study similar to this one
tested the ability of candidates to prime insignificant issues to see if an issue-free
cue could induce voters to make their decisions based on insignificant issues
rather than significant ones.
What explanation is there for so many Democrats agreeing with a
candidate with such conservative views on the environment? (Or does this mean
that perhaps the Democratic Party’s policies on the environment are much more
liberal than the views of its base?). Is there a yet-unmeasured symbols effect for
issue-free cues? Can more emotionally evocative imagery yield measurable
symbolic results? Do issue-free cues act as information in ways unforeseen (and
untested) by this study? Further study is needed, but I feel confident in having
made a small contribution to the body of political science literature.
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